This article sets out my account of disputed matters in ongoing litigation. It does not suggest that the default judgment has been set aside or that any application for a stay has been granted.
A recent Medium article titled “Setting the Record Straight: Public Records and the Shane Liddell Defamation Lawsuit” makes several claims about me, my housing history and my application to set aside a High Court default judgment.
The article presents its conclusions as the result of an independent review of official records.
I dispute important parts of that account.
(Please Note: Two publications concerning the same dispute use the names Dawn Robertson and Rebecca Robertson. Independent verification of the authors’ identities and any connection between them has not yet been established.)
I am not asking readers to accept my position without evidence. I am asking that the evidence be described accurately, that allegations be distinguished from findings, and that the Court be allowed to determine the legal issues.
1. My High Court application has been misrepresented
On 30 September 2026, a default judgment was entered against me in High Court proceedings numbered KB-2026–002990.
I acknowledge that the judgment exists. I also acknowledge that it remains in force unless and until the Court sets it aside.
On 6 November 2026, I submitted an application using Form N244, supported by a signed witness statement, asking the Court to set aside the judgment under CPR 13.2 or, alternatively, CPR 13.3. I also requested an urgent stay of enforcement.

The recent Medium article suggests that my application is undermined by my acknowledgment that I received the claim documents on 21 August 2026.
But that acknowledgment is not new. It appears expressly in my own witness statement.
I have never based my application simply on denying receipt of the documents.
My application raises several separate issues:
· The circumstances in which the claim documents were delivered to my current address.
· Questions concerning the method and date of service relied upon.
· An earlier application for alternative service and whether an order was made.
· The continued use of my former residential address on the default judgment.
· My attempts to verify the proceedings and obtain guidance from the Court.
· The reasons I did not file an acknowledgment of service or Defence.
· The substantive grounds on which I seek to defend the claims.
These matters require examination of the actual procedural record.
2. What happened when I contacted the Court
After receiving the claim documents on 21 August 2026, I attempted to locate the proceedings through the electronic filing system.
I was unable to find the case through the search facility available to me.
Based on the historic behavior of the claimant, I was suspicious of the authenticity of the claim.
On 1 September 2026, I telephoned the King’s Bench Division to seek clarification.
As explained in my signed witness statement, my recollection is that a member of court staff told me the case was not publicly available and that I should wait until I heard from the Court.
I understood that guidance to mean that I should await further information before taking the next procedural step.
I now recognise that a telephone conversation with court staff does not extend a procedural deadline or replace a court order. My witness statement expressly acknowledges that point.
Nevertheless, the conversation is relevant to explaining my actions and why I did not respond within the required period.
My position is that I did not deliberately disregard the proceedings.
Whether that explanation provides a sufficient reason to set aside the judgment is a matter for the Court.
It is not something a Medium article can decide.
3. My application also raises substantive grounds of Defence
The Medium article focuses heavily on the fact that I received the claim documents.
It gives insufficient attention to the other grounds of my application.
The Particulars of Claim include a schedule of 65 alleged publications, many dating back several years.
My witness statement raises questions about the applicable limitation period for defamation claims, including section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 and the single-publication rule under section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013.
I also dispute the claimants’ characterisation of the publications and seek the opportunity to address their precise wording, context and alleged effects.
Where supported by the evidence, I intend to rely on the legal defences available to me, including truth, honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest.
I recognise that the proceedings also involve claims beyond defamation, which require separate legal analysis.
These are issues for the Court to assess. I do not suggest that raising them automatically defeats the claim.
But it is misleading to assess my entire application solely by pointing out that I received the claim documents.
4. A default judgment is not the same as a contested trial
The article repeatedly refers to the September 2026 judgment as though it resolves every factual dispute between the parties.
That is not what happened.
The judgment was entered in default. There was no contested trial at which I presented my Defence and the Court assessed the competing evidence after hearing both sides.
The judgment has legal effect. I do not deny that.
But its existence should not be presented as proof that every allegation made about me in public commentary has been independently examined and established by a judge.
My application seeks the opportunity to defend the proceedings on their merits.
Until the Court decides that application, it is inappropriate for commentators to present predictions about its outcome as settled fact.
5. The allegations about my tenancy history require accurate distinctions
The Medium article also claims that official records establish four instances of eviction or tenancy enforcement involving me between 2013 and 2026.
Those are not interchangeable terms.
A complaint for eviction, a case that was voluntarily dismissed, a landlord’s allegation, a negotiated surrender of a tenancy and a court-ordered eviction are different events.
They should not all be presented as completed evictions without careful examination of the underlying documents.
Indeed, the article’s own account describes one Florida case as dismissed after repayment and another as voluntarily dismissed.
The article also makes claims about tenancies in County Durham.
I dispute the accuracy of its presentation of my housing history, particularly where allegations are treated as established facts without the full supporting correspondence being shown.
The Robert Noble reference
One important document is a signed tenant reference dated 24 March 2026 from my former landlord, Robert Noble.
In that reference, Mr Noble confirmed that I had been his tenant since December 2023, that rent had been paid promptly, and that there had been no complaints. He recommended me as a tenant.

I do not suggest that a positive reference, by itself, proves every detail of how a tenancy ended. But any account of my tenancy history that omits this document is incomplete.
On 28 April 2026, when the authenticity of the reference was questioned, Mr Noble confirmed in writing that he had composed it.

It is correct that there was a Deed of Surrender. There is also documented evidence that landlord, Mr Robert Noble, had to pay an amount of £6,330 to myself, Shane Liddell, upon surrender of the property.

That is relevant documentary evidence.
If an article claims to rely on primary-source evidence, it should address evidence that does not fit its conclusions as well as evidence that appears to support them.
6. The police allegations must also be described accurately
The Medium article refers to Durham Constabulary records concerning complaints made about my online publications.
It describes an investigation, a police visit and an alleged verbal undertaking concerning future posts.
I do not accept that the article’s account, without the complete records and context, establishes every conclusion it draws.
There is an important distinction between a complaint being made, a police investigation taking place, an officer giving advice or a warning, and a court finding that someone committed an offence.
The existence of a police report is not, by itself, a criminal conviction or a judicial finding that the underlying allegations are true.
Any fair account should preserve those distinctions.
7. Claims about restrictions on the court file require evidence
The article states that the High Court designated the case as “privacy restricted” and suggests that my public discussion of the proceedings may therefore be improper.
That is a serious suggestion.
Restrictions on access to court documents are not necessarily the same as an order prohibiting a party from discussing the existence of proceedings or their own legal position.
I have not been shown the specific court order or legal restriction on which the article relies.
If such an order exists, its terms should be identified accurately.
I will comply with any applicable court order. But I do not accept that a general assertion about restricted access establishes that my public comments breached a legal prohibition.
8. The Court, not a commentator, will determine my application
The article concludes that my attempt to set aside the judgment is highly unlikely to succeed.
That is the author’s assessment.
It is not a ruling by the High Court.
My application asks the Court to examine the procedural history, consider my explanation for not responding in time, assess my proposed Defence and determine whether the legal test for setting aside judgment is satisfied.
I have also requested a stay of enforcement.
Submitting an N244 application does not automatically set aside a judgment or stay its enforcement. I recognise that distinction and have never suggested otherwise.
I am seeking a decision through the proper legal process.
Accuracy matters on both sides
I accept that I am entitled to be challenged and criticised.
The same standards of accuracy should apply to anyone publishing allegations about me.
A fair account must distinguish between allegations and findings, between different types of tenancy proceedings, between police complaints and criminal convictions, and between a default judgment and a contested determination of the underlying facts.
It must also describe my application as it was actually made, rather than reducing it to an argument I have never advanced.
I have placed my position before the High Court.
I ask only that the evidence be assessed fairly and that the legal process be allowed to take its course.
This article sets out my account of disputed matters in ongoing litigation. It does not suggest that the default judgment has been set aside or that any application for a stay has been granted.
Finally, I refer you to Case: 1:22-cv-05101 Document #: 46 Filed: 07/05/23 in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION. The emails below were submitted by my then attorney, Marcos Reilly.



I will provide an update on the High Court’s decision once available
– Shane Liddell

